Canada needs policies to fill the gap in its nuclear fuel cycle

Download the JSGS Policy Paper

Download the Discussion Questions

November 28, 2024 was an important date in Canada’s development of nuclear energy policy. On that day the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) named the Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation (WLON) and the Township of Ignace, ON^[1] as the host sites for Canada’s deep geological repository. It marked a significant step, advancing the project to the regulatory decision-making process and towards closing the nuclear fuel cycle in Canada, which begins by mining uranium in Saskatchewan.

Having said that, between the two stages of mining and disposal, gaps remain in the uranium nuclear cycle that should be filled to add value to Canada’s uranium and to position the country to meet its own, and the world’s, increasing needs for nuclear fuel. The world’s capacity is expected to grow from the current electrical capacity of 374,000 MWe (produced by 415 reactor units)^[2] to 444,000 MWe by 2030 and 686,000 MWe by 2040^[3]. Clearly, as the world transitions off fossil fuels and towards electrification, nuclear energy will play an increasing role in global energy supply.

This Policy Paper makes the case I set out in in a recent C.D. Howe Institute Intelligence Memo that called on the Canadian Government to clarify its policies regarding filling the enrichment and reprocessing gaps in the Canadian nuclear fuel cycle^[4]. The issue is addressed here in five parts.

• First, is a brief description of the uranium fuel cycle;
• Second, a discussion of the capacity and the expected demand for uranium resources, specifically enriched-uranium fuel;
• Third, the role of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, and the available global capacity is presented
• Fourth, a review of Canadian statues and policies and international obligations, regarding enrichment and reprocessing; and,
• Fifth, a call for the Government of Canada to establish clear policies and guidelines with respect to both enrichment and reprocessing, given that Canada is a leading exporter of uranium, a role that is likely to be further enhanced by the accelerated deployment of nuclear power called for by COP28’^[5].

Figure 1: Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA).

The uranium fuel cycle is illustrated in Figure 1. It starts by mining and milling, which is done in Canada using the high-grade deposits in Saskatchewan (Cigar Lake Mine, the McClean Lake Mil, McArthur River mine and Key Lake mill)^[6]. It is then refined into a purified form of uranium trioxide (UO₃) domestically in Cameco's Blind River Refinery (world's largest commercial uranium refinery) in Ontario.

The conversion process involves converting UO₃ to either uranium dioxide (UO₂) or to uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), which is done at Cameco’s Port Hope Conversion Facility, in Ontario. No enrichment is done in Canada, but UF₆ is exported^[7] for enrichment in the U.S.A., Europe and Asia. Uranium dioxide is used in Canada to fuel CANDU reactors, which utilize natural (unenriched) uranium in the form of fuel pellets, assembled into fuel-rod bundles. CANDU fuel fabrication is done at Cameco’s Port Hope facility and in BWXT Nuclear Energy Canada Inc. Toronto’s and Peterborough’s, ON, facilities.

After using the fuel in a nuclear reactor, the radioactive spent fuel is stored in water-filled fuel pools, for a few years until the fuel cools down, then in dry storage silos, and is eventually to be deposed of in a deep geological repository. Canada does not have reprocessing facilities. In reprocessing, plutonium and uranium are extracted from spent fuel and recycled into mixed oxides (MOX) fuel, with the remaining high-level waste isolated for disposal. Reprocessing not only produces new fuel material to power nuclear reactors, but also reduces the volume and radiotoxicity of the waste.

In summary, Canada’s fuel cycle lacks the enrichment and reprocessing stages of the fuel cycle. The question is why these two stages are now relevant to Canada, given that they were not needed in the past. The reliance on CANDU reactors, which do not require enriched uranium, made it unnecessary to enrich uranium, and with uranium being plentiful in Canada there was no need to recycle the fuel. There may had been some none-proliferation considerations, though there were no legal or regulatory prohibitions as discussed below.

There are various types of uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.72% of the fissile isotope U-235; the rest is mostly U-238. The heavy-water (D₂O) used in  CANDU reactors is a weak neutron absorber, enabling operation with the low content of the fissionable U-235 in natural uranium. Reactors that use light water (H₂O), such as pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs), employ uranium enriched from 3 to < 5% in U-235; the so-called low-enriched uranium (LEU).

Emerging microreactors use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), enriched from 5% close to the 20% enrichment limit allowed for civilian use of nuclear power. The higher enrichment  prolongs the refuelling cycle, to the extent that a microreactor can be fuelled once for a thirty-year operation. This enables standalone operation with minimal operator intervention, suited for remote communities. There is also depleted uranium, the tailings of the enrichment process, which is mostly U-238, not a fissile isotope in common thermal-neutron reactors^[8], but is converted to the fissile Pu-239 upon neutron absorption in these reactors and is fissionable in fast reactors. Finally, there is U-233, which does not naturally exist, but  is produced by neutron absorption in thorium (Th-232). The latter is widely available in nature, mostly in monazite and bastnaesite, with  worldwide thorium resources of about 6.2 million tonnes^[9] (compared to about 8 million tonnes of reasonably recoverable uranium resources^[10]).

The expected expansion in nuclear power will be matched by increase in the demand for uranium ores. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provide a number of scenarios for the worldwide uranium supply and demand)⁸.  Using  the NEA/IAEA data, Figure 2 was produced to show the two highest and lowest expected uranium supply and demand scenarios. Figure 3 shows the uranium supply gap for high supply/low demand, low supply/high demand, and for  the average of  the two scenarios. Interestingly, visualcapitalist.com predicted a supply gap of 74,000 tonnes/year of tri-uranium octoxide (U₃O₈, a form of raw uranium), by 2040^[11], which is equivalent to 62,751 tonnes of uranium/year. This value is close to that reported in Figure 3 for the deficit scenario (58,797 tonnes).

It should be noted that Canada’s production is expected to represent by 2040 about 30% of the world's uranium supply⁸,  double the 15% contribution in 2022^[12]. On the other hand,  the market share of Canada’s main competitor, Kazakhstan, is expected to decrease from the 43%  level in 2022  to 14 -18% by 2024. Therefore, Canada is posed to become the largest uranium producer, with the added competitive advantage of having a lower production cost because uranium concentrations in Saskatchewan are up to 100 times  higher than the world’s average high-grade deposits^12,.

Regardless of the scenario, Figures 2 and 3 show that the demand for uranium is likely to exceed the supply, if the expected expansion in nuclear power materializes. According to the World Nuclear Organization (WNA), current uranium resources (reasonably assured plus inferred) are about 6.1 million tonnes^[13]. Therefore, uranium supply can meet the demand for about 56 to 96 years, using the 2040 demand levels. There is also a room to increase uranium resources from the current assured 6.1 million tonnes to 8 million tonne of reasonably recoverable uranium resources⁸. However, the availability of natural uranium resources is not the only factor for ensuring adequate supply of nuclear fuel as  most operating reactors and many emerging advanced reactors rely on enriched uranium.

Figure 2: Expected uranium supply (production) and demand (consumption) in high and low scenarios (supply includes planned and prospective exploration at a cost up to US$130/kg Uranium); data from a recent IAEA/NEA report⁸.

 

As Figure 4 demonstrates, most advanced reactors will employ enriched uranium, some at levels higher than the common LEU (≤ 5% enrichment). As the Figure shows, a number of reactor designs rely on HALEU (5 to < 20% enrichment), with low-power reactors (microreactors) using enrichment levels close to the HALEU upper limit of 20%. It is evident that reliance on enriched uranium will continue. Even in Canada, where CANDU reactors dominated, Ontario Power Generation and SaskPower are to acquire BWRX-300 reactors (3.8 / 4.95% enrichment), Ontario Power Generation and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories are demonstrating the MMR-5 technology (9.9 to 19.75%), the Saskatchewan Research Council and Bruce Power are collaborating on the development of eVinci™ (19.75%), and Cameco is involved with Xe-100 (15.5%); where the numbers in parentheses are the enrichment level(s) to be used in these reactors.

As Canada is adopting non-CANDU technology, and without having any enrichment  facilities, Canadian operators will have to import enriched uranium and compete with other jurisdictions embracing similar reactor technologies. In 2022^[14], Russia’s Rosatom had 44% of the world uranium enrichment capacity, with Europe’s (France’s Orano and Britain-Germany-Netherlands’ Urenco) 34%, China’s CNNC at 15%, the USA’s Urenco 7.5%, and the rest of the capacity is provided by other countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran). By 2030, WNA expects the world’s enrichment capacity to increase by about 14%, with Orano providing 36% of the world’s capacity,  39% by Rosatom and 24% by CNNC. In the U.S.A., Urenco plans to increase the capacity of its Eunice plant by 15%^[15]. “There are no current commercial suppliers of HALEU in the West”^[16]. Russia’s TENEX is the only commercial supplier of HALEU worldwide^[17].However, the US Congress allocated, in its 2013 Inflation Reduction Act, US$700 million for the development  of a commercial supply chain for HALEU^[18].

It is obvious that advanced reactors employing HALEU fuel will either rely on one company in a country currently under economic sanctions or await the uncertain future of developing HALEU technology in the West. The production of HALEU is demanding, as it  takes about 42 Separation Work Units (SWU: effort required to separate U-235 and U-238) to produce 1 kg of 19.75% HALEU from about 40 kg of natural uranium, while only 5 SWU is needed to produce 1 kg of 3.5% enriched uranium from about 7 kg of natural uranium^[19]. The U.S. is currently down-blending some if its highly enriched weapon-grade uranium^[20] to meet its domestic demand for HALEU, but it is not clear whether some of that fuel will be exported. In summary, currently and in the near future most of the global production of LEU and HALEU will be by Russia and China, not a very comfortable situation for many Western countries.

 

Figure 3: Expected deficit/surplus in natural uranium (supply includes planned and prospective explorations at a cost up to $US130/kg Uranium); data from a recent IAEA/NEA report⁸.

Figure 4: Enrichment levels for various advanced reactor types^[21]: PWR: Pressurized Light-Water Reactor, BWR: Boiling Light-Water Reactor, HWR:  Heavy-Water  Reactor, SCWR: Supercritical-Water Reactor, GCR: Gas- Cooled  Reactor, GFR: Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor, SFR: Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor,  LFR :Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor, MSR: Molten-Salt  Reactor, ADS: Accelerator Driven System.

 

Nuclear fuel consists of mostly of U-238, some of which is converted to fissile Pu-239 and Pu-241, and not all the fuel’s U-235 is  consumed in a reactor. Therefore, discharged spent fuel still contains fissile isotopes that can be recovered via reprocessing and recycled for reuse as nuclear fuel, “saving up to 30% of the natural uranium otherwise required”^[22]. Reprocessing also leads to the separation of minor actinides^[23] that can be burned in fast reactors. The current global fuel reprocessing capacity is shown in Table 1, which includes only thermal reactors, as fast reactors are designed to burn reprocessed MOX fuel. It should be noted that the heavy-water fuel of India’s reactors listed in the Table is similar to that of CANDU’s fuel.

The  reprocessed fuel can fill the gap in natural-uranium supply, if the demand exceeds the supply in the scenario shown in Figure 3, particularly by 2040. However, reprocessing  of spent nuclear fuel may not be essential until 2040. Nevertheless, reprocessing reduces the mass and radiotoxicity of nuclear waste materials^[24]. It is estimated that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel “from thermal reactors reduces radioactive waste for disposal by almost 20 times, since only fission products having a mass typically not exceeding 5–6% of such fuel require to be disposed”^[25]. As David Jackson indicated in 2003 if “there was a decision to reprocess CANDU fuel….there would be no purely technical obstacle to domestic reprocessing”²².

Table 1: World’s commercial spent fuel reprocessing capacity in tonnes of heavy metal (t-HM) per year^[26]. 

Spent fuel from:
Water-cooled reactors			Gas-cooled reactors	Heavy-water reactors	Total
France, La Hague	Russia, Ozersk (Mayak)	Japan (Rokkasho) Total	UK, Sellafield (Magnox)	India, 4 plants
1,700	400	*	1,500	260	3,860

* Production is planned to start in 2025, reaching 280 tonnes in 2028^[27].

The uranium supply data shows that Canada will become the world’s largest producer of uranium. If the current situation remains unchanged, Canada will continue to export uranium with little value added to its raw mineral. The increased reliance on enriched uranium offers an opportunity for Canada to add value to this precious resource by enriching it, while securing its own domestic needs as it acquires advanced nuclear reactors. Although, as indicated above, fuel reprocessing may not be necessary to meet the emerging demand for nuclear fuel, at least in the near future, it can play an important role in reducing the size and radiotoxicity of Canada’s spent nuclear fuel^[28]. The question therefore is: are their any national policies/laws or international obligations/treaties that stop Canada from having its domestic enrichment and/or reprocessing operations?

As far as enrichment is concerned, there are no explicit official domestic prohibitions on enriching uranium. In fact, in 1973, the then Canada’s Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, Donald S. Macdonald, issued a statement on the establishment of uranium enrichment facilities in Canada. It concluded that “[a]n enrichment project could not be considered an essential national project in Canada,” but it would be “a secondary industry in which a raw material of either domestic or foreign origin would be further processed.”^[29]

The possibility of enriching uranium in Canada was revisited in 2009, in a study by the Centre for International Governance Innovation. This study indicated that "enrichment in Canada is likely to be more profitable than exporting natural uranium and buying back enriched uranium. We expect that a significant domestic market for enriched uranium will arise in the years following 2012 when new reactors using enriched fuel are expected to be built in Canada."^[30] The time is approaching soon for Canada having reactors that use enriched uranium.

Internationally, Canada is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons^[31], and had signed in 2000 an agreement with the IAEA for the application of  related safeguards^[32]. This is the treaty upon which Canada’s policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is based, which includes a “limitation on enrichment of Canadian nuclear material to less than 20%^[33]. In summary, there appear to be no internal legal hurdles and no international constraints that prevent Canada from enriching uranium.

An obvious concern for many is that reprocessing of spent fuel produces plutonium, a material that can be used in a nuclear weapon. However, Canada as a partner of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is subject to inspection and monitoring by the IAEA, to ensure that the treaty’s intention of not diverting nuclear materials to weapons is followed. In fact, “[c]o-operation between the IAEA and a State is necessary for the successful implementation of safeguards in any context.”^[34] In addition, as a nuclear-industry recycling/reprocessing task team indicated, “there appears to be no policy inhibitors to prevent the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes in Canada”.^[35]

The same study also contended that  “Canada has an extensive legislative and regulatory framework that appears to address” six guiding principles identified by the team.” These are: (i) ensuring peaceful uses of reprocessed fuel, (ii) meeting Canada’s international obligations, (iii) limiting risks to the health and safety of the public and the environment, (iv) long-term management of generated radioactive wastes, (v)  limiting risks related to the transportation of reprocessed fuel, and (vi) controlling nuclear substances import/export of equipment and information via nuclear cooperation agreements and additional protocols to Canada’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

There appears to be an impression that “Canada’s policy on reprocessing at some point changed to accord with the US policy declared by President Carter in 1977”²³, and that “Canadian Policy regarding non-proliferation assumes no enrichment or reprocessing in Canada”^[36]. “It is worth pointing out that President Carter’s policy was expressed in the  amendment to the U.S.’ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 . “The Amendment barred U.S. economic and military assistance to any country that imported or exported spent nuclear fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment equipment, materials, or technology but failed to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards”.^[37] But as indicated above, Canada is a partner to the non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, Canada’s Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning states that “Reprocessing in Canada would require consideration of all relevant factors by the federal government prior to its deployment, including ensuring the health, safety and security of people in Canada, and compliance with non-proliferation safeguards and international treaties”^[38].This indicates that Canada is not prohibiting reprocessing.

There are no apparent legal national inhibitions and no international restrictions on Canada developing uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing industries. Having such capacities will add value to Canada’s large uranium exports, secure its own supply of enriched uranium as it acquires advanced reactors, and reduce the size and radiotoxicity of the accumulating spent fuel inventory. Reprocessing will also be needed to operate at least in one of the reactors being developed in Canada^[39].

As a major producer of uranium, Canada is in a strong position to demand the acquisition or access to enriched and reprocessed fuel and/or associated technologies from countries that possess such fuel and technology. The absence of clear policies on enrichment and reprocessing can be a hindrance to the domestic development of related technologies and may be understood as being a silent  prohibition. Therefore, the Government of Canada should establish clear policies and regulations on enrichment and reprocessing to guide the nuclear industry in acquiring suitable reactor technologies with secured fuel supply. Beyond the opportunity for Canada to engage in the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle, one can argue that as a major uranium producer, Canada has an obligation to join other Western countries in developing enrichment\reprocessing industries that can compete with Russia and China to support the rapidly emerging advanced reactors. 

The European model, in which governments partially own enrichment companies, such as Urenco and Orano, is a good one to follow, as it enables governments to  meet their international treaty obligations. The Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center pointed out in April 2023 that with a “potential United States (US) and/or European Union (EU) ban on uranium civilian reactor fuel exports from Russia…, Kazakhstan could double its share of the European market if it builds its own conversion and enrichment facilities”^[40]. The banning  has already occurred. On May 13, 2024, U.S. President Biden signed the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, ruling out “the import of Russian uranium products into the United States as of August 12, 2024”^[41]. Moreover, Russia responded by  placing its own ban on exporting uranium to the U.S^[42] There is also the uncertainty caused by the Nigerien authorities taking over control of the 63.4% Orano-owned uranium mine in Arlit , Niger (a leading producers of uranium)^[43]. The time is right for Canada to consider having its own uranium enrichment industry. Canada has its own conversion (to UF₆) facilities that serve as  a springboard to the development of enrichment facilities. 

Canada is not unfamiliar with reprocessing radioactive materials, as it had been used to extract nuclear isotopes from irradiated targets. Reiterating David Jackson’s conclusion in 2003, there are “no purely technical obstacle[s] to domestic reprocessing”^23. It is about time to reexamine the feasibility of establishing a reprocessing industry in Canada.

Esam Hussein, PhD, PEng, FCSSE, is a professor emeritus of Engineering and Applied Science and an adjunct professor in Physics at the University of Regina (UofR). He is also a professor emeritus of Mechanical Engineering at the University of New Brunswick (UNB). He retired as Dean of Engineering and Applied Science at UofR. After completing his undergraduate studies and a master's degree in nuclear engineering at Alexandria University, Egypt, he earned a PhD also in nuclear engineering from McMaster University. He was employed as a Nuclear Design Engineer at Ontario Hydro (now Ontario Power Generation). Subsequently, he joined the University of New Brunswick – Fredericton, where he taught in Chemical then Mechanical Engineering, and served as Department Chair, Associate Dean and Vice-President and President of the Association of UNB Teachers,.

[1] The Nuclear Waste Management Organization selects site for Canadas deep geological repository, November 28, 2024.

[2] PRIS - Reactor status reports - In Operation & Suspended Operation - By Country, December 2, 2014.

[3] Positive trends continue for global nuclear fuel cycle - World Nuclear News, September 7, 2023.

[4] Esam Hussein - Nuclear is Coming Back. What About Canada’s Fuel Supply Chain? | C.D. Howe Institute | Canada Economy News | Canadian Government Policy, April 5, 2024.  

[5] Item 28(e), Global Stocktake, United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), United Arab Emirates, Nov./Dec. 2023.

[6] Uranium and nuclear power facts, July 3, 2024.

[7] In 2022, 80% of Canada's uranium production was exported¹².

[8] A thermal-neutron reactor, commonly referred to as thermal reactor, is a reactor in which the emitted-by-fission fast neutrons are slowed-down by a moderator (such as H₂O, D₂O or graphite) to the thermal energy (energy due to thermal motion) where fission is most probable in U-235 or U-233. On the other hand, fast reactors do not require moderation as they rely on fast neutrons for fission, mostly in Pu-239.

[9] Miloš René, Nature, Sources, Resources, and Production of Thorium | IntechOpen, in Descriptive Inorganic Chemistry Researches of Metal Compounds, Takashiro, Ed., 2017 (DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.68304).

[10] Uranium 2022:  Resources, Production and Demand, A Joint Report by the Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency,  NEA No. 7634, OECD 2023.

[11] The Global Uranium Market in 3 Charts, August 2023.

[12] World Uranium Mining Production - World Nuclear Association, May 15, 2024.

[13] Supply of Uranium - World Nuclear Association, August 23, 2024.

[14] Uranium Enrichment - World Nuclear Association, November 10, 2024.

[15] Uranium enrichers mark expansion milestones - World Nuclear News, October 11,  2024.

[16] Ken Petersen, A focus where it is needed -- ANS / Nuclear Newswire,  Nuclear News, Sep 7, 2023.

[17] Jamie Smyth and Sarah White, The US plan to break Russia’s grip on nuclear fuel,  The Financial Times,  January 21 2024.

[18] H.R.5376 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress, August 16, 2022.

[19] SWU Calculator | Urenco, last accessed December 3, 2024.

[20] Ella Nilsen, The US is dismantling nuclear warheads to power next-gen reactors | CNN, , CNN, September 9, 2024.

[21] Advanced Reactor Information System | Aris, last accessed December 3, 2024.

[22] Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel - World Nuclear Association,  August 23 , 2024.

[23] Actinides are nuclides heaver than actinium. Minor actinides are actinides that are not uranium or plutonium.

[24] David P. Jackson, Status of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Partitioning and Transmutation,  Nuclear Waster Management Organization, November (2003).

[25] I. A. Kozhokar and V. V. Kharitonov, Evaluation of the effectiveness of investments in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing | Atomic Energy, At Energy 135, 264–274, August 12, 2024.

[26] Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel - World Nuclear Association, August 23 , 2024.

[27] Provisional Operation Plans for Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (Possible Annual Quantities of Reprocessing and Plutonium for MOX Fuel Fabrication) - February 9, 2024 | Release > Press Release - JNFL, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, February 9, 2024.

[28] There was about 62,830 (t-HM) of heavy metal of CANDU spent fuel in storage at reactor sites as of June 30, 2023, expected to reach 106,570 (t-HM) by the planned end operation of Canada’s current reactors, according to the Nuclear Waste Management Organization: T. Reilly, Nuclear Fuel Waste Projections in Canada – 2023 Update,  and How much is there?, December 2023, and   How much is there?, last accessed December 5, 2024.

[29] Appendix 1 in: 1976 Review pf Uranium Enrichment Prospects In Canada, Report EP 77-4, Energy, Mines and Resources, posted on https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/11/560/11560133.pdf, last accessed December 5, 2024.

[30] David Jackson and Kenneth W. Dormuth, Uranium Enrichment in Canada, Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 2009, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/nef_5.pdf,  last accessed December 5, 2024.

[31] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) | IAEA and UNODA Treaties Database, last accessed December 5, 2024.

[32] Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons | IAEA, October 11. 2000.

[33] Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Government of Canada, last modified June 24, 2024.

[34] Richard Hooper, The Changing Nature of Safeguards, IAEA Bulletin, 45, 1, June 2003,  https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull45-1/45103450711.pdf

[35] P. D. Thompson, Proposed Guiding Principles for Recycling/Reprocessing Used Fuel in Canada, 42nd Annual CNS Conference / 47th Annual CNS/CNA Student Conference, Saint John, New Brunswick. June 4-7, 2023.

[36] CANDU Advantages in Recycling the Recovered Uranium from Spent LWR Fuels, Briefing on Processing and Reprocessing, Directorate of Assessment and Analysis, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, November 25, 2014 eDoc: 4581797, posted on https://www.ccnr.org/ATIP-CNSC_2014_2023.pdf, last accessed December 6, 2024.

[37] Historical Documents - Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia Document 6.

[38] Canada’s Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning, October 17. 2023.

[39] SSR-W (Moltex Energy, Canada) is to be “fuelled with very low purity, reactor-grade plutonium

recycled from stocks of spent uranium oxide fuel” (Advanced Reactor Information System | Aris, last accessed December 6, 2024)

[40] Kazakhstan could lead Central Asia in mitigating the world’s energy and food shortages, April 2023.

[41] Prohibiting Imports of Uranium Products from the Russian Federation - United States Department of State, May 14, 2024.

[42] Russia places 'tit-for-tat' ban on US uranium exports - World Nuclear News, World Nuclear News, November 18, 2024.

[43] Nigerien authorities in control of SOMAÏR operations - Orano - World Nuclear News, World Nuclear News, December4,  2024.

Please email your feedback or suggestions on the Policy Brief to the editor: dale.eisler@uregina.ca